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Classification for NASA Payloads
• Why apply SS&MA on Sub-Class D Missions?
• Scoping SS&MA to Sub-Class D Missions
• Challenges of small satellites (e.g. CubeSats) 
• Resources and initiatives 
Characterization Class D 
Priority (Criticality to Agency Strategic Plan) and 
Acceptable Risk Level Low priority, high risk
National Significance Low to medium
Complexity Medium to low
Mission Lifetime (Primary Baseline Mission) Short < 2 years
Cost Low
Launch Constraints Few to none
In-Flight Maintenance May be feasible and planned
Alternative Research Opportunities or Re-flight 
Opportunities Significant alternative or re-flight opportunities
Achievement of Mission Success Criteria
Medium or significant risk of not achieving mission 
success is permitted. Minimal assurance 
standards are permitted. 
NASA’s Class D Mission Definition
Reference: NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8705.4 - Risk Classification for NASA Payloads
NASA’s Class D Mission Definition
Reference: NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8705.4 - Risk 
Classification for NASA Payloads
Sub-Class D Missions: Low budget, fast paced 
projects (~$50M, 2 years) executed under a set of 
streamlined processes aimed at mitigating only 
the most significant risks to mission success. 
They are normally executed by/with: 
• An atmosphere of innovation & creativity
• Cross-trained thinly spread teams (with limited oversight)
• A high percentage of COTS & low heritage parts
• A high degree of reliance on vendor SS&MA processes 
• An open-loop “make-it-work” corrective action system
• An emphasis on cost & schedule
Why apply SS&MA on Sub-Class D Missions?
• Traditional arguments against:
─ Stifles innovation & creativity (rules based) 
─ Too costly & time consuming
─ Unnecessary when risk of mission failure is acceptable 
• The real story; SS&MA is critical to mission success:
─ Tailorable, flexible, & identifies where rules are good enough or 
where innovation is required
─ Cost can be limited to initial risk assessments followed by the 
mitigation of the most significant risks
─ Ensures projects allocate their limited resources judiciously and 
intelligently 
Mission failure is not acceptable due to blindly/poorly applied 
processes; SS&MA provides critical insight & intelligence
The Clash between Traditional SS&MA & 
Sub-Class D Mission Characteristics
Traditional SS&MA Sub-Class D Missions
A conservative (risk-adverse) approach & a 
rigorous adherence to a comprehensive set of 
established rules
An atmosphere of innovation & creativity 
complimented by an agile & surgical application 
of tailored requirements/guidelines
Performed by independent SS&MA specialists 
(not responsible for the project’s cost/schedule)
Executed by cross-trained thinly spread teams 
(with limited oversight)
A high degree of independent verification & 
validation (V&V) as applied to the assembly, 
subsystem, & system levels
A limited degree of V&V usually performed at 
the system level (which includes a high 
percentage of COTS & low heritage parts)
An extensive document library, wordy plans for 
each SS&MA element (Safety, QA, CM, Risk 
Management, Orbital Debris Assessments, etc.), 
& a flow down of process requirements 
throughout the supply chain
A minimal set of documents with several 
disciplines combined into one plan & a high 
degree of reliance on vendor SS&MA processes
A closed-loop root cause analysis based 
corrective action system
An open-loop “make-it-work” corrective action 
system
A de-emphasis on its impact to project cost & 
schedule An emphasis on cost & schedule





Optimizing the amount of SS&MA for Sub-Class D Missions
(Depends on empowering & guiding all project personnel on how to integrate SS&MA into 
their work & providing them SS&MA specialist when needed) 
A conservative (risk-
adverse) approach & a 
rigorous adherence to a 
comprehensive set of 
established rules
An atmosphere of innovation 
& creativity complimented by 
an agile & surgical 
application of tailored 
requirements/guidelines
• Ensure appropriate level of QA is chosen and agreed to by all stakeholders
o Don’t overlay AS9100 or ISO9001 when test & inspection requirements are sufficient 
• Prioritize the order in & degree to which SS&MA actions are implemented based on:
o Project risk , phase, schedule, & budget (as assessed based on the content of the project 
plan & concept of operations)
• Use peer reviews/assessments to optimize the level of SS&MA
Performed by independent 
SS&MA specialists (not 
responsible for the 
project’s cost/schedule)
Executed by cross-trained 
thinly spread teams (with 
limited oversight)
• Embed/integrate SS&MA into all project elements & phases
o Cross-train key project personnel in basic SS&MA principles
o Hold everyone responsible for SS&MA,  but name one person as the SS&MA lead
o Ensure SS&MA is a topic during all project meetings & reviews
o Use peer reviews to compensate for the lack of independence
A high degree of 
independent verification & 
validation (V&V) as 
applied to the assembly, 
subsystem, & system 
levels
A limited degree of V&V
usually performed at the 
system level (which includes 
a high percentage of COTS 
& low heritage parts)
• Identify critical SS&MA requirements & their flow down considering critical:
o Mission operations, systems, designs, & acquisitions
o Manufacturing, testing, & operations activities
o Historical issues, best practices, & lessons learned
• Witness only those tests (including the test set-up) that are deemed to be the highest risk
An extensive document 
library, wordy plans for 
each SS&MA element, & a
flow down of process 
requirements throughout 
the supply chain
A minimal set of documents 
with several disciplines 
combined into one plan & a 
high degree of reliance on 
vendor SS&MA process
• Streamline/reduce documentation & identify critical SS&MA clauses to include in specifications 
& contracts
• Establish & make use of prescreened vendors
o Augment with vendor site visits and/or
o Bench audits of vendor procedures
A closed-loop root cause 
analysis based corrective 
action system
An open-loop “make-it-work” 
corrective action system
• Limit root cause analysis to:
o Safety critical issues 
o Negative trends & repeat issues
o Out-of-family results
A de-emphasis on its 
impact to project cost & 
schedule 
An emphasis on cost & 
schedule
• Baseline the SS&MA plan off of a detailed concept of operations
• Limit SS&MA to safety critical & first flight items & the most significant risks to mission success
• Limit external/specialized SS&MA support
Small Spacecraft SMA Challenges
Small Spacecraft SMA Challenges
• Small spacecraft projects usually have the following features:
o Standardized interfaces (i.e. EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) (rings), standard 
form (cubesats) and containerization (i.e. P-PODS) for rideshare launches 
o “Build and test” versus extensive analysis of design
o Greater use of commercial off-the-shelf parts 
o Lower cost
o Rapid development 
o Higher risk tolerance 
o Lower barrier-to-entry for space missions (university and small business researchers, etc.)
o Possibility for unique applications
• These features pose potential safety and mission assurance 
challenges and risks. 
• Deployment of small satellites that are too small to be detected by 
the Space Surveillance Network also poses a potential collision risk 
to other spacecraft. 
• Deployment of large constellations of small satellites could 
potentially worsen the orbital debris problem.
Definition of Small Spacecraft @NASA: 
“Small” is defined as less than 180 kg –based on the maximum mass for an ESPA-class 
secondary satellite payload.  
To be considered a “spacecraft” it must separate from its launch vehicle and operate 
independently for at least some portion of its mission in space. In additional to 
satellites and probes, small entry vehicles and landing craft can be small spacecraft.  
Spacecraft deployed from and/or operating independently around the ISS or other space 
system can be small spacecraft. 
Typically small spacecraft are launched as secondary payloads, although small launch 
vehicles could deliver small spacecraft as primary payloads.
Sounding rocket payloads and attached or hosted payloads that remain attached to their 
host spacecraft or launch vehicle throughout their operational mission are not 
considered small spacecraft.
We do not consider balloon payloads to be small spacecraft.
Additional Definitions:
Minisatellite:    100 kg or higher
Microsatellite:  10-100 kg
Nanosatellite:    1-10 kg
Picosatellite:      0.01-1 kg
Femtosatellite:  0.001-0.01 kg
A cubesat is a special category of nanosatellite.  
One cubesat unit (1U) has dimensions of 10 by 10 
by 11 centimeters.  Cubesats have been built in 
1U, 1.5U, 2U, 3U and 6U sizes.
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Small Spacecraft SMA Challenges
Small Spacecraft Community of Practice
• To help support small spacecraft development, OSMA initiated a Small 
Spacecraft Community of Practice (CoP) on the NASA Engineering Network 
(NEN) in December 2013 and co-leads this CoP along with the Small 
Spacecraft Technology Program Executive in Space Technology Mission 
Directorates. 
• The CoP serves as forum for representatives from NASA Flight Projects, 
Engineering, Safety and Mission Assurance, Science, Space Technology, 
and Human Exploration and Operations Directorates to share challenges, 
approaches, and lessons learned for development of small spacecraft 
projects, including the implementation of safety, mission assurance, design, 
and test guidelines and requirements. 
Small Spacecraft Community of Practice 
Small Spacecraft CoP (continued)
• Subtopics established in the CoP include the following Safety and Mission 
Assurance disciplines: Workmanship, Software Assurance, Reliability, 
Quality Assurance, EEE Parts, Orbital Debris Mitigation and Meteoroid 
Environment.  Applicable guidance documents and links to other 
resources; websites, including OSMA and ODPO websites;  and “ask the 
experts” point of contacts (POCs) are provided on the CoP.
• Membership of the small spacecraft CoP is 100+ with members from the 
NASA Centers and HQ. Access to the information of small spacecraft CoP
is limited to NASA badged personnel. Future plans are to post the 
guidance that S&MA develops for high-risk tolerant/small spacecrafts to 
the OSMA website for public access. 
• A Risk Class D/CubeSat EEE Parts tiger team has been initiated to 
develop guidance for EEE parts selection for small spacecraft
Small Spacecraft Community of Practice 
Other Resources and Initiatives
• LSP-REQ-317.01, Launch Services Program Level Dispenser and CubeSat
Requirements Document defines the Launch Services Program (LSP) 
program level and technical requirements placed on containerized CubeSat
dispenser and Picosatellite (CubeSats) satellites for integration on NASA 
LSP ELV mission. This document is available of the small spacecraft CoP.
• LSP is also developing a “CubeSat 101” guidance document and plans to 
complete this document later this year. 
• The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office initiated a study last year to 
assess the impact of Cubesat deployment on the orbital debris 
environment.  The study is expected to be completed in September 2015. In 
addition, plans are to update the NASA Standard 8719.14 to provide 
requirements on Cubesat design and deployment (e.g,  configured so that 
they are trackable). 
